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Abstract
We examine whether the growth of the internet has reduced the effectiveness of
government regulation of advertising. Specifically, we combine variation in state and
local regulation of oﬄine alcohol advertising with data from field tests that random-
ized exposure to online advertising for 275 different online advertising campaigns to
61,580 individuals. People are 8 percent less likely to say that they will purchase an
alcoholic beverage in states that have alcohol advertising bans compared to states that
do not. For consumers exposed to online advertising, this gap narrows to 3 percent.
We also show similar effects for four changes in local oﬄine alcohol advertising restric-
tions where we observe advertising effectiveness both before and after the change. Our
results suggest that online advertising could reduce the effectiveness of attempts to
regulate other advertising channels because online advertising substitutes for (rather
than complements) oﬄine advertising. Our results also suggest an informative role for
online advertising in places with bans: The effect of online advertising is dispropor-
tionately high for new products and for products with low awareness in places that
have bans.
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1 Introduction
Advertising regulation is widespread. There are full or partial bans on marketing commu-
nications in many industries, including alcohol, pharmaceuticals, video games, gambling,
tobacco, and legal services. The existence and severity of these restrictions varies by coun-
try, by state, and by city. Such regulations often date from a time when local restrictions
on advertising could be expected to have a binding effect on the types of advertising that
the local population encountered. Today, widespread use of the internet means that a firm’s
potential customers may encounter advertising content online that their local government
has tried to restrict.
This paper examines how the effectiveness of online ad campaigns for alcoholic bever-
ages changes when there are restrictions on oﬄine advertising. By examining differences in
advertising oﬄine exposure that are not due to firm-level advertising decisions, we are also
able to shed light on whether online advertising substitutes for or complements oﬄine ads.
To measure the effectiveness of the online ad campaigns, we use data from a large-scale set
of field experiments that randomized exposure to online display advertisements of alcoholic
beverages. These field experiments asked 61,580 US web users about purchase intent for
alcoholic products, covering 275 campaigns for different products on different websites from
2001 to 2008. For each of these campaigns, a mean of 223 people completed the survey, of
whom roughly half were randomly exposed to an ad for an alcoholic beverage, and the others
were exposed to an alternative placebo advertisement.
We contrast how randomized exposure to online advertising affects purchase intent in
locations that place restrictions on out-of-home advertising with locations that do not. We
do this in two ways. First, we compare the 17 states that regulate out-of-home advertising
such as billboards, storefront signage, and transit ads with the 33 states that do not regulate
such advertising for alcohol. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics that foreshadow our core
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findings. Among those who did not see the online ad campaign, the percentage of respondents
‘very likely’ or ‘likely’ to purchase is 2.04 percentage points lower, or relatively 8% lower in
states with ad bans than in states with no ad ban. The relative difference in purchase intent
between states with an ad ban and states without an ad ban narrows to 3% after advertising
exposure. Given that ad exposure was randomized, this suggests that online advertising
reduces the effectiveness of oﬄine advertising bans. In the body of the paper, we conduct a
wide battery of tests to show that the pattern in Table 1 holds with thorough econometric
analysis. We check that there were no systematic differences in the kind of ads that people
saw and the people who saw the ads across states with and without oﬄine ad bans. We show
that the results are robust when allowing the effect of exposure to advertising to vary with
a variety of state characteristics such as alcohol consumption, alcohol abuse, and alternative
state regulations that restrict the sale, consumption and marketing of alcohol. We also show
that there is no similar effect for other CPG categories.
Table 1: Percentages of respondents who say they are likely to purchase in states with and
without out-of-home advertising bans
Out-of-home Exposed
Ad Ban No Yes
No 28.88 31.01
Yes 26.84 30.18
The analysis of state-level regulations provides a large-sample understanding of differ-
ences between places with regulation and places without them. However, there still may be
systematic differences in how people in states with ad bans respond to alcohol advertising
that are not related directly to the ban. Therefore, as a second empirical approach, we
examine changes in four local regulations that provide a natural experiment on advertis-
ing regulation because they were either enacted or rescinded during the period for which
we have data. These local regulations are: A 2003 ban on out-of-home alcohol advertising
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in Philadelphia; a 2004 elimination of a ban on college newspaper alcohol advertising in
Pennsylvania; a 2007 increase in enforcement of an alcohol advertising ban on San Francisco
public transit; and a 2007 withdrawal (in New York City) of a self-imposed ban on hard
liquor advertisements on broadcast television.
The changes in local regulations complement the state-level results by relying on the
weaker identification assumption that the changes in the effectiveness of online alcohol ads
within a given location are due to changes in oﬄine advertising rather than location-specific
changes over time in online alcohol advertising responsiveness. This assumption is partic-
ularly plausible because one Pennsylvania regulatory change increased oﬄine advertising
regulation and the other decreased regulation, but both show that more regulation of oﬄine
advertising translates to more effective online advertising. Our estimates of the effect of
oﬄine advertising bans are reasonably similar, despite the much smaller sample sizes and
specificity of local regulatory changes.
Crucially for firms, we also show that the disproportionate effect of online advertising in
places with advertising bans is related to levels of product awareness. Online advertising for
products that have low levels of awareness is particularly effective in places with out-of-home
advertising bans. By contrast, for products that have high levels of awareness, there is little
difference in online advertising effectiveness between places with and without bans. This
suggests that online display advertising plays an informative role for people in places with
out-of-home advertising bans. It also provides some support for the results being driven
by diminishing marginal effectiveness of advertising goodwill, since high-awareness products
are already at the point of steep diminishing returns (Nerlove and Arrow, 1962; Dube et al.,
2005; Dube and Manchanda, 2005; Hitsch, 2006).
Also important for firms is the implication of our research that internet advertising sub-
stitutes for oﬄine advertising. Indeed, our results provide evidence on an unusual but useful
natural experiment which allows us to identify how oﬄine advertising relative to online ad-
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vertising affects purchase intent. This is valuable because usually it is hard to separate out
the effects of oﬄine and online advertising campaigns, given that online and oﬄine cam-
paigns are launched at the same time. As emphasized by Silk et al. (2001), “[the internet]
looms as a potential substitute or complement for all of the major categories of existing
media and appears capable of serving a wide range of communications objectives for a broad
array of advertisers.” This matters because it is not clear whether the unique capacity of
the internet to target and interact with users means that it extends and enhances existing
external advertising campaigns or acts as a substitute for them.
Our finding that online display advertising is a substitute for oﬄine display (primarily
billboard) advertising contributes to a growing literature in marketing that explores the
relationship between oﬄine and online environments for customer acquisition (Bell and Choi,
2009), brands (Danaher et al., 2003), word of mouth (Bell and Song, 2007; Forman et al.,
2008), purchases (Forman et al., 2009; Brynjolfsson et al., 2009), customized promotions
(Zhang and Wedel, 2009), ad pricing (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2009), search behavior (Lambert
and Pregibon, 2008) and price sensitivity (Chu et al., 2008). We believe ours is the first study
to empirically investigate consumer substitution between online and oﬄine advertising.
Our results more generally provide an expanded framework in which to understand the
effectiveness of online advertising. Most of this literature, including Manchanda et al. (2006)
and Chatterjee et al. (2003), has focused on measuring the effect of ad exposure and clicks.
We contribute to this literature by emphasizing that the effectiveness of online advertising
cannot be considered independently from the availability and feasibility of oﬄine media.
Previous research has discussed the difficulties of tailoring local regulations to the internet
era in the areas of gambling (Clarke and Dempsey, 2001), tobacco (Cohen et al., 2001),
and prescription drugs (Fox and Ward, 2005). However, there has been little systematic
empirical work on the internet’s influence on the effectiveness of existing local regulation
outside of tax policy (Ellison and Ellison, 2009; Goolsbee, 2000; Goolsbee et al., 2010).
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This dearth of empirical research extends to marketing regulations. Our results suggest
that advertising restrictions are less effective when locals are able to access the internet.
Prior research has used aggregate non-experimental data to show that partial advertising
bans have negligible effects on total alcohol consumption - arguing that substitution by
advertisers between advertising channels plays a role (Nelson, 2003; Young, 1993).1 Frank
(2008) also suggested there may be substitution by advertisers between print, television,
and radio advertising channels. Our research provides evidence of a related mechanism that
renders ad bans less effective - when one channel is blocked, the alternative channels become
more effective. In the case of an out-of-home advertising ban, there may be little effect
on overall customer consumption, because the ban makes advertising in the non-regulated
media outlets more effective. With the advent of the internet, websites whose servers lie
outside the ban’s jurisdictional boundary provide a persistent alternative advertising outlet,
and it therefore seems likely this mechanism for rendering partial advertising bans ineffective
will persist.
Our findings suggest that the internet reduces the ability of local authorities to restrict
the effect that advertising has on the local population. While the type of substitution that
we document between different types of media has been possible previously, never before
has there been a media channel that is so pervasive and that has such an ability to reach
a local population when outside its political borders. Castells (2001) wrote, “the Internet
decisively undermined national sovereignty and state control” of the flow of information
to its inhabitants (p. 168). Not only are governments unable to regulate access to online
advertising, but our results indicate that the absence of oﬄine advertising actually increases
the effectiveness of online advertising.
1Though Saffer (1991) found a negative effect of an advertising ban on aggregate demand in an interna-
tional study, Young (1993) and Nelson and Young (2001) demonstrate that this negative effect reflected a
failure to control sufficiently for differences in cultural attitudes to alcohol consumption and serial correlation,
and argue that the true effect is positive.
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2 Data on Display Advertising
We use data from a large database of surveys collected by a media metrics agency to measure
the effectiveness of 275 different online alcohol ad campaigns. The data span campaigns that
were run from 2001-2008. The mean campaign lasted 73 days. The shortest campaign lasted
14 days, and the longest lasted 200 days. There were 57 separate products advertised in
total and each had an ad that ran on either 3 or 4 websites. In this paper, we use ‘campaign’
to describe an advertising campaign for a single product run on a single website category.
There were a variety of different creative formats used for these banner ads. 58 percent
of ads were “skyscrapers” (tall ads that extend down the webpage), 19 percent were shaped
as medium and large rectangles, and 8 percent were “super banners” that crossed the width
of the page. 24 percent of ads were displayed on portals, 14 percent on sports websites,
and 8 percent on entertainment websites. In our main specifications, we include fixed effects
for each campaign to control for such potential heterogeneity in the deployment of creative
format.
These 275 campaigns were reasonably evenly distributed across years, though there were
slightly more in 2004 and 2007. 34 percent of the campaigns were for beer, 8 percent for
wine, and the rest for spirits and other liquor. Individuals browsing the website where the
campaign is running are either exposed to the ads or not, based on the randomized numerical
algorithm placed on the ad server. Those who were not randomly selected to see the ad saw
a dummy ad for a neutral organization. Both exposed and not exposed (control) respondents
were recruited via an online survey invitation that is typically issued by a pop-up window.
In each case they are not aware they are being monitored, as the survey invitation is neutral
and does not make explicit that it will be asking questions about banner ad effectiveness.
Because ads were randomized, both exposed and control groups have the same likelihood
of seeing oﬄine ads, if they are permitted by law, as well as other online ads. Furthermore,
7
because respondents are browsing the same website over the course of only a few weeks, they
are similar in terms of unobserved dimensions. Thus, the randomization implies that they
have the same underlying purchase probability. The only variable of difference between the
two groups is the randomized presence of the ad campaign being measured, so differences in
consumer attitudes toward the advertiser’s brand can be attributed to the online campaign.
The online questionnaire appears as the website visitors try to navigate away from the
webpage where the focal or dummy ad is served. This means that the questions measure
the immediate effect of seeing the ad. The online questionnaire asked the extent to which
a respondent was likely to purchase a variety of products (including the one studied) on a
five-point scale. In the main specification in this paper, our dependent variable is whether
the respondent said they were ‘likely’ or ‘very likely’ to purchase the product. In discretizing
our scale into a single dependent measure, we follow the arguments in familiar marketing
research textbooks. Malhotra (2007) and Aaker et al. (2004) suggest that discretizing an
ordinal scale reduces the issues surrounding treating an interval scale as continuous. However,
we recognize that whether such scales should be treated as discrete or continuous is a gray
area in marketing practice (Fink, 2009; Kline, 2005). Therefore, in the appendix (Table A-2)
and elsewhere, we replicate all our results with the full scale as our dependent measure in a
linear regression. Consistent with Bentler and Chou (1987) and Johnson and Creech (1983),
we find no qualitative difference between the specifications.
The survey asked three additional questions which we use in our analysis. First, we use
respondent ratings on whether they had a favorable opinion of the product as a robustness
check on our purchase intent results. Second, we use whether the respondent recalled seeing
the ad in question (presented alongside some decoy ads) to inform our understanding of the
effect. Third, we use respondent statements about general awareness about the product to
distinguish between products where there is likely already media saturation and ones where
there is not. Table 2 shows summary statistics for these survey data.
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The survey also asked respondents about their gender, income, age, and the number of
hours they spent on the internet. Table 2 displays summary statistics for these demographic
variables. On average, the survey respondents were disproportionately male, which may
reflect the fact that 35 percent of the alcohol ads were shown on websites devoted to gaming,
sports, and other specifically ‘male’ topics. The average age is higher than in the general
population, because people under 21 years old are excluded. The 9.4 hours per week that
people claimed to spend on the internet is slightly higher than recent data that suggest on
average people spend 32.2 hours a month on the internet.2 Mean income, at $72,603, is not
too different from the average mean household income in the US of $77,634. We converted
the responses to zero-mean-standardized measures and used these variables as controls in
our regressions. This allowed us to “zero out” missing data. The results are robust to both
non-parametric specifications that control for the missing data through fixed effects and the
omission of these controls entirely. We look at the answers of respondents who were identified
as being in the target market for the product. The zipcodes given by the survey respondents
allowed us to match them to a location (county or state).
If a respondent was in the exposed condition and returned to that particular webpage,
or refreshed that webpage before exiting the website, the respondent is counted as having
seen the ad again. The median exposure was to have seen the ad one time (56 percent of
respondents who were in the exposed condition). We check the robustness of our results to
excluding people who saw the ads multiple times in Table A-1, and show that their exclusion
actually increases the relative magnitude of our point estimates for the incremental effects
of out-of-home advertising bans on the effectiveness of banner ads.
Survey-based measures offer the advantages of having a large number of respondents and
can be collected consistently at different locations and times (Clark et al., 2009). Also, the
fact that websites are often unable to sell alcohol directly because of the extensive nature
2comScore Networks 2009 data.
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of bans on the direct shipping of alcohol to consumers by states3 means that the website
purchase measures used by Manchanda et al. (2006) are not available. Survey responses are
weaker measures of advertising success than purchasing or profitability (as used by Reiley
and Lewis (2009)), because many users may claim that they intend to purchase but never
do so. Still, as long as people reporting higher purchase intent are actually more likely to
purchase (and the group that is exposed to ads is truly random), the direction of results
holds. In other words, the direction of our core results depends only on whether our survey
measures are positively correlated with actual purchase outcomes. This positive correlation
between stated purchase intent and purchase outcomes has been well established in many
product categories by Bemmaor (1995) and others. In particular, Morwitz et al. (2007)
found this correlation to be particularly strong for product-specific surveys such as the ones
conducted to generate our data.
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Full Sample
Mean Std Dev Min Max Observations
Purchase Intent 0.30 0.46 0 1 61580
Intent Scale 2.51 1.49 1 5 61580
Favorable Opinion 0.36 0.48 0 1 59686
Opinion Scale 3.28 1.14 1 5 59686
Ad Recall 0.23 0.42 0 1 51923
Exposed 0.54 0.50 0 1 61580
Ad Ban 0.30 0.46 0 1 61580
Income 70603.1 55799.0 5000 250000 52839
Female 0.40 0.49 0 1 61580
Age 43.7 14.0 21 99 61562
Weekly Internet Hours 9.42 10.5 0 31 61580
Observations 61580
3http://freethegrapes.org has details on the full set of laws.
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3 State-Level Results
We explore how these survey measures were affected by oﬄine advertising restrictions in two
ways. In this section we use a straightforward specification that reflects both the variation in
state laws governing outdoors advertising of alcohol and the randomized nature of exposure
to advertising in our data. In section 4, we examine changes in local laws.
3.1 Discussion of state-level regulations
The Twenty-First Amendment (1933) granted states broad legal powers over the distribution
and sale of alcohol as well as some power to regulate advertising for alcoholic beverages.4
We gathered information on laws restricting the advertising of alcoholic beverages out-of-
home using two main sources of regulations: ‘State Alcohol Advertising Laws,’ a report in
conjunction with Georgetown University published by the Center on Alcohol Marketing and
Youth in 2003; and ‘Out-of-Home Alcohol Advertising: A 21st Century Guide to Effective
Regulation,’ published by the Marin Institute in 2009. We then verified the current status of
laws and whether they imposed oﬄine advertising bans by visiting each state’s liquor control
website. Appendix Table B-1 gives the sources and histories of each law.
Figure 1 reflects the geographical distribution of the 17 states that had laws. In Mary-
land and Pennsylvania, the laws were municipal (Baltimore and Philadelphia) rather than
statewide, so we include only households that fall within those city limits as being subject
to the law. There has been little change to state laws since the widespread adoption of the
internet. Philadelphia’s ban started in 2003, after the beginning of our data set. In section 4,
we exploit this time variation along with three other changes in municipal alcohol advertising
regulation.
4Limitations on this power stem from First Amendment free speech guarantees. For example, the
44 Liquormart (1996) decision struck down a Rhode Island State law that banned price advertising for
alcoholic beverages (Milyo and Waldfogel, 1999). However, the Schmoke (1996) decision upheld an alcohol
billboard advertising ban in Baltimore.
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Figure 1: Distribution of states with advertising bans during our sample period
The state-level ad restrictions largely affected billboards and signage. In our specifica-
tions, we treat all out-of-home advertising bans as a binary variable, whether they relate to
storefront signage, billboards, transit advertising, or a blanket ban on advertising. Three of
the bans forbid all billboard advertising (Maine, Alaska, and Hawaii) while Vermont restricts
all billboard advertising with extra provisions for alcohol advertising. In the appendix Table
A-1, we show that our results are robust to excluding these states. In order to prevent
challenges on grounds of free speech,5 the legal language in the alcohol bans typically em-
phasizes that the measures are designed to prevent under-age drinkers from being exposed
to advertising.
Despite various restrictions on advertising, both externally and internally imposed, al-
cohol manufacturers and distributors still spend a relatively large amount on advertising in
5So far, the bans in our data have not been struck down by the courts. In contrast, the Lorillard (2001)
case in Massachusetts struck down a billboard advertising ban for cigarettes that was felt to have overreached
the aim of protecting school children from cigarette advertising.
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general and out-of-home advertising in particular. They spend an average of 15.2 percent of
revenue on ads for liquor, 11.5 percent for wine, and 8.6 percent for beer. This compares with
a mean of 7.1 percent for non-alcoholic beverages (Tremblay and Tremblay, 2005). According
to Frank (2008), spirit manufacturers spent an average of $348.6m annually in 2004 on out-
of-home advertising. Tremblay and Tremblay (2005) find that Anheuser Busch spent 20% of
its advertising expenditure on out-of-home advertising. While not the dominant advertising
channel, out-of-home appears to be an important channel in this industry. Out-of-home may
be a particularly important advertising channel for alcohol because, as discussed by Frank
(2008), major television networks do not typically carry ads for spirits (we use a short-term
exception to this policy in NYC when we examine changes in local regulations in section 4.)
Similarly, the display ads we study are particularly important for online alcohol advertising
because Google and other search engines do not accept ads for spirits.
Table 1 summarizes the key empirical insight of the paper. In states that have out-
of-home advertising bans, the likelihood that someone says they are likely to purchase a
product is 8 percent lower relatively for the group that is not exposed to the online ad.
There are many things that could drive this lower purchase intent in ad ban states besides
the actual advertising ban (such as anti-alcohol attitudes), which is why we focus on the effect
of randomized exposure on these different groups, why we conduct considerable additional
analysis, and why we also show an alternative set of results for changes in local regulations.
The raw statistics suggest that in ad ban states, underlying purchase intent is relatively 3
percent lower after randomized exposure to internet advertising. In other words, exposure to
internet advertising has a larger effect on people who live in ad ban states. Figure 2 displays
how the mean differences in purchase intent between participants who were exposed and
not exposed to the ads varies across the states with and the states without bans on out-of-
home advertising. Each square captures the effect for a different state. There are large 95%
confidence intervals (the lines) for the size of the aggregate effect for any one state. While
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Figure 2: Distribution of difference in exposed and control conditions for likely purchase
intent across states with and without an advertising ban
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the average difference between states with ad-bans and states without ad-bans is similar
to Table 1, there is considerable heterogeneity within the grouping of states that have ad
bans or who do not. This motivates our analysis in Table 7, where we control for different
observable sources of heterogeneity at the state level in alcohol attitudes and regulations.
3.2 Specification and main results
For person i who was exposed to advertising campaign j in state s, their purchase intent
reflects
Intentsij = I(αExposureij + βExposureij × AdBansi + θXij + γs + δj + ij > 0) (1)
Therefore, α captures the main effect of being exposed to an ad on purchase intent;
β captures the core coefficient of interest for the paper - whether exposure is more or less in-
fluential in places with an advertising ban; Xij is a vector of controls for gender, age, income,
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and time online; γs is a series of state fixed effects that control for heterogeneity in baseline
purchase intent at the state level and includes the main effect of the oﬄine advertising ban
(AdBansi ), which is why this lower-order interaction is not included in our specification; and
δj controls for heterogeneity in baseline purchase intent for the different campaigns. In these
regressions, we assume that the ij has a type-2 extreme value distribution, implying a logit
specification. Standard errors are clustered at the state level in accordance with the sim-
ulation results presented by Bertrand et al. (2004), that suggest that state-level clustering
in respondent-level panel data, where policy variation occurs at the state level, is an appro-
priate technique to address potential downwards bias for standard errors. This represents a
conservative empirical approach, as in our setting we have randomization at the respondent
level as well.
Table 3 reports the results. Columns (1) through (5) use a logit specification. Column
(1) simply measures the effect of exposure to the respondent’s stated purchase intent. Col-
umn (2) presents the basic differences-in-differences specification, while Column (3) presents
results for the core specification that includes the product-level fixed effects (δj). Column (4)
presents results where we use non-parametric controls for customer characteristics. The re-
sults are reasonably similar across specifications, though adding product-level controls makes
our estimates more precise.
The main result from Table 3 is that the effect of exposure to an online ad in states that
ban out-of-home advertising is larger than in states that do not ban out-of-home advertising.
A comparison of the predicted probabilities implied by our logit model suggests that, if there
were an out-of-home advertising ban in effect, then exposure to an ad would increase purchase
intent by 6 percent compared to an increase of 2 percent in states where there was no ban.
One explanation for this result is that oﬄine ad bans mean that firms are advertising to
consumers who are at a less steep part of their goodwill response function for advertising. The
theory proposed in Nerlove and Arrow (1962) suggests that all forms of advertising contribute
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to a goodwill stock for the product, and that the marginal effectiveness of advertising goodwill
has diminishing returns. This is been empirically documented in recent advertising literature
(Dube et al., 2005; Dube and Manchanda, 2005; Hitsch, 2006). Theoretically, an advertising
ban could limit the amount of goodwill accumulated by residents of states with ad bans,
meaning that the marginal effect of an exposure would be higher in states with bans than
in states with no bans.
There are of course many identification assumptions that have to hold to draw such a
conclusion. Therefore we devote sections 3.3 and 3.4 to exploring the identification assump-
tions that are inherent in this result, allow the effect of exposure to vary with pertinent state
characteristics, and show that the difference in advertising responsiveness across states is
specific to alcohol advertising and does not apply to closely related categories.
In columns (1) to (3), the standardized measures of our demographic variables give us
a weakly positive effect from income and internet hours, and a negative effect from age.
Column (4) reports the results of a non-parametric specification where we included fixed
effects for every age, income, and internet usage group. This has the advantage of letting
us control in a non-parametric manner for missing observations. The main effect that we
estimated for the interaction between outdoor advertising and exposure was very similar to
our previous estimates. Column (5) provides an alternative specification where we include no
demographic controls. The main results are statistically similar to (4), though the exclusion
of the demographic controls is reflected in a more negative log-likelihood suggesting that the
controls do help with efficiency. This is to be expected given the randomized nature of our
data.
Another econometric concern is the interpretation of the interaction terms in Table 3.
Research by Ai and Norton (2003) suggests that the interaction in a non-linear model may
not capture the true cross-derivative. Recent work by Puhani (2008), however, does suggest
that the treatment effect in differences-in-differences specifications have the same sign as the
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Table 3: People who are exposed less to oﬄine advertising react more to online advertising
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Purchase IntentPurchase IntentPurchase IntentPurchase IntentPurchase Intent Intent Scale Intent ScaleFavorable Opinion Ad Recall
Exposed × Ad Ban 0.0596∗∗ 0.0673∗∗ 0.0676∗∗ 0.0698∗∗∗ 0.0460∗∗∗ 0.0589∗∗∗ 0.0539 -0.0143
(0.0293) (0.0268) (0.0270) (0.0263) (0.0160) (0.0207) (0.0351) (0.0384)
Exposed 0.0997∗∗∗ 0.0823∗∗∗ 0.0684∗∗∗ 0.0613∗∗∗ 0.0734∗∗∗ 0.0459∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗ 0.0925∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0130) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0162) (0.0104) (0.0124) (0.0217) (0.0299)
Female 0.0851∗∗∗ 0.0848∗∗∗ 0.0900∗∗∗ 0.0880∗∗∗ 0.0293∗∗ 0.0270 -0.0976∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗
(0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0183) (0.0190) (0.0135) (0.0171) (0.0231) (0.0219)
Std. Internet Hours 0.0515∗∗∗ 0.0514∗∗∗ 0.0476∗∗∗ 0.0315∗∗∗ 0.0381∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.0870∗∗∗
(0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0123) (0.00843) (0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0125)
Std. Income -0.000264 -0.000158 -0.0198∗∗ -0.0272∗∗∗ -0.0319∗∗∗ 0.0279∗∗∗ -0.0331∗∗∗
(0.0100) (0.0100) (0.00994) (0.00646) (0.00810) (0.00729) (0.00969)
Std. Age -0.135∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.239∗∗∗
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0155) (0.0102) (0.0143) (0.0128) (0.0150)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Campaign Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo Fixed Effects No No No Yes No No No No No
Observations 61580 61580 61580 61566 61580 61580 61580 58585 51923
Log-Likelihood -37191.6 -37190.3 -35940.3 -35770.9 -36099.2 -110305.7 -90026.4 -36802.6 -26108.4
R-Squared NA NA NA NA NA 0.0519 NA NA NA
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01. ‘Ad Ban’ is collinear with state fixed effects and
omitted.
logit interaction. In order to ensure that our results are not a function of the nonlinearity
of the estimation function, we performed the Ai-Norton specification check for each of our
specifications. The results were similar in size and relative magnitude and significant at the
95 percent level. We also focus on the implied changes in marginal probabilities which take
into account the potential for non-linearities in the logit model when discussing the economic
significance of our results. In the appendix (Table A-1, Column (1)), we show that a linear
probability model gives qualitatively similar results, which provides reassurance that the
non-linear functional form does not drive our results.
Column (6) of Table 3 replicates our results for a linear model where the dependent
variable is the full 5-point scale that we assume to be continuous. The similar results
suggest that our discretization of the scale is not driving our results, though as discussed
above treating an ordinal scale as continuous is not without problems. Column (7) presents
results from an ordered logit that also uses this scale as its dependent variable with similar
results. Column (8) presents results for whether the respondent said they had a favorable
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opinion of the product as the dependent variable.
Column (9) presents results for ad recall as the dependent variable. The main effect
of exposure on ad recall is, unsurprisingly, larger. Interestingly, the advertising bans are
unrelated to ad recall. Recalling the ad on the website is not related to whether oﬄine
alcohol ads are allowed. It suggests that the difference we observe in purchase intent is not
a result of ads being more unusual and therefore more noticeable to inhabitants of states
where there are advertising bans. Instead, there is a difference in how effective the message
of such ads is between the populations of regulated and non-regulated states.
3.3 Controlling for systematic differences between states with ad bans and with-
out ad bans
The random assignment of advertising exposure means that we have a clean measure of
advertising effectiveness, so the core remaining identification assumption that underlies Table
3 is that online alcohol advertising is not systematically more effective in states that have
an advertising ban compared to states without such a ban for reasons other than the ban.
We received the data after people who had not completed the survey were removed.
One potential concern is that there may be different survey attrition or recruitment rates
for survey-takers exposed to the ad in states that had bans compared to states that did
not have bans, that could influence our results. For example, it would be problematic for
our interpretation if states that had ad bans also had inhabitants who were more likely to
be motivated to complete surveys enthusiastically if they had seen an alcohol ad. A two-
sided t-test comparing the relative proportion of respondents who were exposed to the ad
in states that had ad bans and states that did not have ad bans, strongly rejected that
the proportions were different (p-value=.77). We also checked for systematic differences in
recruitment ability in states that had ad bans by comparing the proportion of survey-takers
relative to the population of each state in states that had ad bans. A two-sided t-test (p-
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value=.0.97) provided strong evidence that there was no difference in the proportion of the
state population recruited. This suggests that there was no difference in the ability of the
marketing research firm to generate the appropriate sample size from states that had ad
bans and states that did not.
One possible alternative explanation could be that the ads viewed in states with ad
bans were designed to be more effective by alcohol beverages companies. Such geographical
targeting could take place either if there were regional differences in the viewership of sites
in the experiment or if the website matched ads to viewers by the geographical location of
their IP address. However, we found no difference in the proportion of viewers exposed to
different campaigns in states with ad bans and states without. Furthermore, as shown in
Table 4, there is little difference in the creative formats used across states. As one would
expect given the sample size, there are some statistically significant differences across the 20
categories. However, for the 6 categories where there was a statistically significant difference,
the differences tend not to be economically significant. Furthermore, the differences tend
to cut in the wrong direction if they were going to provide an alternative explanation of
our result. For example, the largest difference across states with bans and without bans is
that people in states with ad bans tend to have seen more medium rectangle ads. However,
medium rectangles are one of the smaller and less visible ad formats.
Another explanation is that the viewers in states with ad bans and states without ad
bans have different demographic profiles. For example, if states with ad bans had a younger
population who might be more likely to be influenced by alcohol advertising, then this could
explain why online alcohol advertising was more effective in such states. However, as Table
5 shows, there is no statistically significant difference in states with ad bans and without
bans in terms of average age, gender, income, or internet usage for survey-takers that were
exposed to ads and survey-takers that were not.6 If we use buckets for these demographic
6Analysis at the state level is similar.
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Table 4: Relative proportion of different advertising formats for states with and without ad
bans
Mean No Ban Mean with Ban T-Test
Banner (468x60) 0.0284 0.0253 1.99
Button (120x90) 0.0055 0.0047 1.14
Large Rectangle/Square (336x280) 0.0372 0.0384 -0.70
Skyscraper (120x600) 0.0267 0.0229 2.56
Vertical Rectangle (240x400) 0.0001 0.0001 -0.13
Half-Banner (234x60) 0.0008 0.0006 0.94
Full page 0.0039 0.0035 0.62
N/A 0.0180 0.0212 -2.43
Interstitial 0.0003 0.0004 -0.48
Super Banner (728x90) 0.0604 0.0557 2.12
Floating 0.0060 0.0067 -1.05
Pop Up (250x250) 0.0012 0.0012 -0.05
Rectangle (180x150) 0.0026 0.0031 -0.88
Medium Rectangle (300x250) 0.1675 0.1915 -6.70
Wide Skyscraper (160x600) 0.6158 0.5986 3.74
Half Page Ad (300x600) 0.0050 0.0049 0.24
Vertical Banner (120x240) 0.0162 0.0166 -0.37
Square Button(125x125) 0.0002 0.0001 0.31
Other 0.0019 0.0026 -1.53
Unknown 0.0023 0.0018 1.12
Rectangle (300x100) 0.0001 0.0002 -0.74
Observations 61,580
variables rather than a continuous measure, the difference remains statistically insignificant.
For example, the average number of people under the age of 35 (who buy the majority of
alcohol) is the same across states with ad bans and without.
Another set of concerns lies with the potential for the effects of online advertising exposure
to vary in systematic ways connected with the state’s characteristics, which are in turn
correlated with the ability of alcohol advertising to persuade. Because respondents are
Table 5: Demographic profiles for states with and without ad bans by exposure to ads
Mean No Ban Mean with Ban T-Test
Exposed to Ad
Age 43.57 43.55 0.16
Female 0.41 0.42 -1.33
Income 70,820 70,800 0.03
Weekly Internet Hours 9.59 9.62 -0.25
Observations 33,322
Not Exposed to Ad
Age 43.94 43.96 -0.15
Female 0.40 0.39 0.71
Income 70,034 71,067 -1.31
Weekly Internet Hours 9.29 9.08 1.56
Observations 28,258
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randomly assigned to whether or not they are exposed to the ad but are not randomly
assigned to whether or not they live in a state with oﬄine advertising bans, there may be
other reasons for the systematic difference we observe in the effect of exposure in states that
have bans and states which do not. This problem is apparent in our data: respondents who
are not exposed to alcohol advertising were 8 percent less likely to express positive purchase
intent in states that had billboard bans, suggesting there is indeed an underlying systematic
difference. In this section, we address this problem by controlling for the effect of multiple
state characteristics on exposure. In section 4, we tackle this identification issue directly by
examining locations which experienced changes in advertising bans.
Table 6 summarizes the rich set of observables that we explore. The first seven variables
capture different aspects of alcohol consumption and abuse. The idea is to control for
consumer-side heterogeneity that may be driving our results. For example, states where
people consume more alcohol may be more likely to have people who respond to alcohol
ads and to have an alcohol advertising ban. The last five variables reflect different states’
attempts to restrict advertising content and the consumption and the sale of alcohol. This
helps control for the possibility that we may be picking up something more general about
states that take a tough line on alcohol sales, and the likelihood of their population to
respond to alcohol advertising.
For each potential source of observable heterogeneity Observablesti , we reran the speci-
fication in equation (1) with an additional term Exposureij × Observablesti that captured
how this moderated the main effect of being exposed to the ad. Because there was time-
variation in these measures, we also included the main effect, Observablesti . Table 7 reports
the results. The final column presents results from a combined regression where we include
interactions for each of these observables in the same specification. It is apparent that, as
would be expected, some of these sources of state variation do impact the effect of exposure
on advertising. People from states with large populations of non-drinkers were less likely
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to be influenced by an online alcohol ad, people from states with more heavy drinkers and
youth drinkers were more likely to influence by an online alcohol ad, and people in states
with strict restrictions on Sunday alcohol sales were less likely to be influenced by ads.
Crucially, however, in all cases the key effect of interest Exposureij × AdBansi remains
positive and significant. While not conclusive, these results help rule out the most obvious
alternative explanations of our results occasioned by the lack of orthogonality of the state
oﬄine ad ban to state characteristics pertaining to alcohol consumption.
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Table 6: State Level Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Description Source
BeerDrunk 21.6 3.27 Gallons (000) of beer drunk per capita in
state each year
Alcohol Epidemiologic Data System.
LaVallee, R.A.; Williams, G.D.; and Yi,
H. Surveillance Report #87: Apparent Per
Capita Alcohol Consumption: National,
State, and Regional Trends, 19702007.
Bethesda, MD: National Institute on Alcohol
Abuse and Alcoholism, Division of Epidemi-
ology and Prevention Research (September
2009).
WineDrunk 2.31 0.90 Gallons (000) of wine drunk per capita in
state each year
Alcohol Epidemiologic Data System.
LaVallee, R.A.; Williams, G.D.; and Yi,
H. Surveillance Report #87: Apparent Per
Capita Alcohol Consumption: National,
State, and Regional Trends, 19702007.
Bethesda, MD: National Institute on Alcohol
Abuse and Alcoholism, Division of Epidemi-
ology and Prevention Research (September
2009).
SpiritsDrunk 1.40 0.37 Gallons (000) of spirits drunk per capita in
state each year
Alcohol Epidemiologic Data System.
LaVallee, R.A.; Williams, G.D.; and Yi,
H. Surveillance Report #87: Apparent Per
Capita Alcohol Consumption: National,
State, and Regional Trends, 19702007.
Bethesda, MD: National Institute on Alcohol
Abuse and Alcoholism, Division of Epidemi-
ology and Prevention Research (September
2009).
BingeDrinkers 15.4 2.65 Percentage of binge drinkers (males having
five or more drinks on one occasion, females
having four or more drinks on one occasion)
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
annual survey data 2001-2008
HeavyDrinkers 5.28 1.04 Percentage of heavy drinkers (adult men hav-
ing more than two drinks per day and adult
women having more than one drink per day)
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
annual survey data 2001-2008
YouthDrinkDrive 2.34 0.74 Percentage of students who during the past
30 days drove a vehicle 1 or more times when
they had been drinking alcohol
Youth Risk Behavior Survey, Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention. The YRBS is
an in-school survey of students in grades 9
through 12.
YouthDrinking 43.2 3.73 Percentage of students who at least had one
drink of alcohol on 1 or more of the past 30
days
Youth Risk Behavior Survey, Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention. The YRBS is
an in-school survey of students in grades 9
through 12.
Teetotalers 45.3 7.70 Percentage of adults who have not had alco-
hol in the last 30 days
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
annual survey data 2001-2008
NoKidsAds 0.38 0.79 State bans alcohol ads that depict children.
For example CT’s law reads [No alcohol ad-
vertisement shall include] any scene in which
is portrayed a child or objects, such as toys,
suggestive of the presence of a child or which
in any manner portrays the likeness of a child
or contains the use of figures or symbols
which are customarily associated with chil-
dren. [CT Reg. 30-6-A31(a)(6)].
State Advertising Laws: Current Status and
Model Policies, Center on Alcohol Marketing
and Youth, Georgetown University
NoAthleticAds 0.28 0.69 State bans alcohol ads that Associate Alcohol
with Athletic Achievement
State Advertising Laws: Current Status and
Model Policies, Center on Alcohol Marketing
and Youth, Georgetown University
NoSundayTrading 0.25 0.44 State bans majority of Sunday off-premises
alcohol sales
Alcohol Policy Information System, NIH
NoOpenBeverages 0.92 0.27 State prohibits open containers of alco-
hol in the passenger compartments of non-
commercial motor vehicles.
Alcohol Policy Information System, NIH
StateLiquorStores 0.28 0.45 State-run retail distribution system for hard
liquor
Alcohol Policy Information System, NIH
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3.4 Falsification Checks
As demonstrated in the previous section, observable differences in the ad campaigns, char-
acteristics of respondents, and characteristics of the states with ad bans do not provide an
alternative explanation of our results. To explore whether there are unobserved differences in
general advertising responsiveness, we look at other types of closely related advertising that
are not subject to the ban to see whether we observe similar results that may be suggestive
of unobserved heterogeneity. Specifically, we rerun our main specification on similar data for
‘placebo’ categories. The first placebo category is high-sugar/high-salt snacks and candies.
Like alcoholic beverages, these have been targeted by the US Surgeon General’s office as
an area of excess consumption with potential negative side-effects. Column (1) in Table 8
reports the results for these snacks. As expected, we see an effect from exposure to an ad;
however alcohol ad bans do not change this relationship - the interaction term is negative
and insignificant. Column (2) repeats this falsification exercise for non-alcoholic beverages,
and again we find no significant effect from out-of-home advertising bans on the effect of
exposure. Column (3) repeats the falsification exercise for all food items, again finding no
increase in the effect in states with bans. This supports our interpretation that the effect we
are measuring is specific to the alcohol category, and therefore more likely to be related to
the presence or absence of an advertising ban.
4 Changes in local advertising regulations
The second way we show the impact of oﬄine advertising bans on online advertising ef-
fectiveness is by examining four different changes in local alcohol advertising regulations.
These help overcome worries that, despite the above checks for underlying state-level hetero-
geneity and the falsification test, there is still the possibility that there may be unobserved
heterogeneity in advertising responsiveness that is specific to the alcohol sector. We focus
on several instances where, during the period of our data, alcohol advertising bans were
25
.Table 8: Falsification Checks
High Sugar Foods Non-Alc. Beverages All Food
(1) (2) (3)
Purchase Intent Purchase Intent Purchase Intent
Exposed × Ad Ban -0.00493 -0.00268 -0.00467
(0.0372) (0.0549) (0.0173)
Exposed 0.0712∗∗∗ 0.0835∗∗ 0.0758∗∗∗
(0.0263) (0.0340) (0.0104)
Female 0.164∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗
(0.0269) (0.0364) (0.0120)
Std. Internet Hours 0.0514∗∗∗ 0.0646∗∗∗ 0.0465∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0168) (0.00616)
Std. Income -0.0653∗∗∗ -0.0106 -0.0465∗∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0181) (0.00710)
Std. Age -0.0688∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.0338∗∗∗
(0.0150) (0.0155) (0.00818)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Campaign Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 45310 23983 194351
Log-Likelihood -28468.6 -13875.9 -117830.4
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01.
‘Ad Ban’ is collinear with state fixed effects and omitted.
enacted or rescinded. The idea here is that such changes in laws allow us to identify pre-
cisely the causal effect of the law on responses to online advertising because we can compare
(for people living in the same place) the reactions to online ads before and after there is a
law prohibiting forms of alcohol advertising. There are four such cases for which we have
observations in our data: (1) The enactment of a law in Philadelphia prohibiting alcohol
advertising from public property; (2) The repeal of a law in Pennsylvania restricting the
ability of student newspapers to publish alcohol advertising; (3) A toughening of regulations
by the San Francisco public transit authority meaning that alcohol advertising would be
fined at $5,000 a day; and (4) A loosening of a self-imposed policy, which meant that one
broadcast TV affiliate in New York started showing liquor ads.
Even when using a change in a law to identify the effect of ad bans, a lingering concern is
that the change in law may be connected with an unobserved change in behavior over time
that is also systematically connected with how people respond to advertising. To control for
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this possibility, in each instance of a change in the law we include data on a control group of
people who should display a similar time trend because they live in a similar place reasonably
nearby. This allows us to use a triple difference specification to difference out changes in
advertising responsiveness due to location and changes due to changing time trends. In
equation form, this means that our specification in equation (1) becomes for person i who
was exposed to advertising campaign j in location l at time t:
Intentlijt = I(αExposureij + β1Exposureij × AffectedGroupli × AdBanPeriodlit +
β2Exposureij × AffectedGroupli + β3Exposureij × AdBanPeriodlit + (2)
λAdBanPeriodit + ηAffectedGroup
l
i × AdBanPeriodlit + ”
θXij + γ
l + δj + ij > 0)
Reflecting the switch from the state level to a more local analysis, γl is now a series of
county fixed effects that control for heterogeneity in baseline purchase intent at the county
level. Again, these substitute for the main effect of AffectedGroupli. As we are no longer
looking at state-level variation in policy but instead at within-state variation, we cluster
standard errors at the campaign level rather than the state level.
Table 9 displays our case-study results. In all cases the sample size is relatively low and
as a result our results are sometimes only marginally significant. However, taken together
they suggest that oﬄine advertising bans positively influence the effectiveness of online ads.
Column (1) looks at a change in law that occurred in 2003 when the Philadelphia city
government decide to ban alcohol ads from all city property. This change in policy is dis-
cussed in detail by Haas and Sherman (2003), and appears to have been motivated by policy
advocates highlighting the issue of alcohol ads on bus shelters that were commonly used
by students going to school. As our control group, we use people who live in the same
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combined metropolitan statistical area but over the border either in Camden, New Jersey
or in ‘Wilmington-Newark’ in Delaware and Maryland. The results in column (1) suggest
that people who live in Philadelphia became incrementally more responsive to online alcohol
advertising after the ban, compared both to their previous responsiveness and to people in
neighboring states in that time period.
Column (2) looks at a change in law in the opposite direction, also in Pennsylvania.
In Pitt News v. Attorney General of Pennsylvania (No. 03-1725), July 29, 2004, the federal
court struck down a Pennsylvania law banning advertising of alcoholic beverages in college
newspapers. Though this law, which pertains to print media rather than out-of-home ad-
vertising, is different from the ones we have studied so far, it should have similar effects if
the behavior we observe is due to awareness of the product. To study this law, we looked
at the behavior of consumers in college towns such as Waynesburg, PA which is home to
Waynesburg University and the ‘Yellow Jacket’ student newspaper. We defined a ‘college
town’ as one where more than 20 percent of the population are students. We compared
responsiveness to online alcohol advertising in these college towns with similarly sized towns
in surrounding areas where there was no such newspaper. This focus on college towns and
their counterparts meant that our analysis excluded the Philadelphia metropolitan area we
studied in column (1). This is attractive from an identification point of view, as it means
that we are studying two different types of populations within the same state who during
a similar time-frame experience a change in exposure to oﬄine alcohol advertising but in
different directions. If it were indeed state-level heterogeneity that explained our results,
we would not expect to find different directions of effects in these two cases. Consistent
with our prior findings, column (2) indicates that in the period prior to the ad ban being
struck down, these college-town populations were indeed more responsive to online alcohol
advertising that they were afterwards, relative to the population in non-college towns.
Column (3) examines a change in policy regarding alcohol advertising by the San Fran-
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cisco transit authority. As described by Simon (2008), the Marin Institute, a public pressure
group, presented evidence that despite a contract prohibiting alcohol advertising, in at least
15 cases CBS Outdoor had erected alcohol ads on transit authority property that violated
their contract. In response to public outcry, at the end of 2007 the San Francisco transit
authority issued a new contract that promised to fine advertising companies $5,000 per day
if an advertising company violated their contract and displayed alcohol ads. We study how
this toughening of regulatory enforcement affected online ad responsiveness. Therefore our
estimates in this case should be thought of as comparing the effect of the official ban of
the kind that already existed in California that we have studied so far, with increased and
improved enforcement of that ban. As a control group, we use respondents in Los Angeles
and San Jose, which while geographically distant, are other large metropolitan communities
in the state; again, if it is a systematic change in state-specific behavior that is driving
our results, we would expect to see similar time trends in how effective online exposure to
advertising is across each city. However, the results of column (3) suggest that again there
was an incrementally positive effect of the ad ban for San Francisco survey-takers relative
to their previous behavior and relative to survey-takers in Los Angeles and San Jose in the
same period.
Column (4) focuses on TV advertising, extending our previous focus on outdoor and
print advertising. As described by Elliot (2007), at the end of November 2007 WNBC-TV,
NBC’s flagship New York network affiliate, decided to start showing hard liquor ads on its
broadcasts. Liquor ads had been shown on cable before, but it was the first network airing
of spirit ads in 6 years. What is attractive about this change in policy is that it represents
a change in advertising practices within the alcoholic beverage category. Beer is regularly
advertised on broadcast television, but spirits have been subject to self-regulation. This
means that we can evaluate whether people living in the same place responded differently
to online spirits ads compared to how they did previously, while controlling for general
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Table 9: Case studies of instances where alcohol advertising bans changed in our sample
period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Purchase Intent Purchase Intent Purchase Intent Purchase Intent Purchase Intent
Purchase Intent
Exposed × Ad Ban × Affected Group 0.881∗ 1.791∗∗∗ 2.310∗∗ 1.005∗ 0.563∗∗∗
(0.489) (0.666) (0.943) (0.581) (0.215)
Exposed 0.646 0.0958 0.0958 0.909∗∗∗ 0.134
(0.447) (0.139) (0.0948) (0.302) (0.0838)
Exposed × Ad Ban -0.662 -0.0978 -0.469∗ -0.940∗∗∗ -0.219∗
(0.508) (0.253) (0.284) (0.326) (0.131)
Exposed × Affected Group -0.678∗ -0.657 -0.0740 -0.886 -0.287
(0.411) (0.434) (0.483) (0.541) (0.187)
Ad Ban -0.572 0.822∗∗ 0.115 0.712∗∗∗ 0.0573
(0.552) (0.365) (0.269) (0.218) (0.0956)
Ad Ban × Affected Group -0.445 -0.412 -0.439 -0.256 -0.178
(0.430) (0.590) (0.885) (0.351) (0.156)
Campaign Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1429 1957 2524 1991 7927
Log-Likelihood -781.5 -1063.0 -1430.0 -1172.0 -4552.4
Date of change December 2003 End July 2004 December 2007 November 2007 Combined
Change in Regulation Ban of alcohol
advertising on
Philadelphia’s
public property
Law banning al-
cohol ads in stu-
dent newspapers
struck down
Stiff fines for al-
cohol advertising
on San Francisco
public transporta-
tion
NBC affiliate
in New York
rescinds self-
imposed ban on
airing hard liquor
ads
Combined
Affected Sample Respondents in
Philadelphia
Respondents in
college towns in
PA
Respondents in
San Francisco
New York respon-
dents asked about
liquor campaigns
Combined
Control Group Respondents in
Camden, NJ
and Wilmington-
Newark, DE
Respondents out-
side of Philadel-
phia in non-
college towns in
PA
Respondents in
Los Angeles and
San Jose, CA
New York respon-
dents asked about
beer campaigns
Combined
Logit estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the survey level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01.
changes in the effectiveness of online campaigns for alcohol using beer. The results again
suggest that before the ban was rescinded, there was a relative incremental advantage in
terms of effectiveness for spirits relative to beer. However, after the ban was rescinded this
incremental advantage decreased. The fact that we obtain similar results for changes in
regulation governing print media and also television media is informative, since it suggests
that our results concerning the effect of restrictions on out-of-home advertising campaignscan
be applied cautiously to other media.
Column (5) presents results of a specification that combines data from columns (1) -
(4). The results are similar, though our estimate of the coefficient of interest Exposure ×
AdBan× AffectedGroup is more precise.
The aim of these case studies is to provide evidence for the robustness of our results in
Table 9, so we checked how the economic size of the effects they suggested compared to our
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earlier estimates. This is again a logit framework with interaction terms, so in order to get
reliable estimates of marginal effects, we calculated the population average predicted proba-
bilities and compared them for our different treatment and control groups. The estimates in
Table 3 suggest that in states with ad bans the effect of advertising exposure is around 1.2
percentage points higher. In two of our case studies our results are similar. Our estimates
for Philadelphia residents suggest that after the ad ban, there was a 2.2 percentage point
increase in the effect of exposure to advertising on purchase intent. Our estimates for New
York residents suggest that before the spirits ad ban was repealed, there was a 1.8 percentage
point greater effect of exposure to online spirits advertising on purchase intent relative to
other alcohol. However, in two case studies the estimates of the incremental advantage of
online advertising when oﬄine ad bans are in place were far higher. For respondents in San
Francisco, there was an incremental lift of 14 percentage points. For respondents in college
towns, it was 24 points higher. It could be that these are unusual populations who are easily
motivated by stimuli to drink alcohol. However, since these estimates of the marginal effects
have large confidence intervals and are statistically indistinguishable from 2.2 percentage
points, it is more likely that these high point estimates reflect the relative imprecision of our
estimates due to the smaller sample size used in these case studies. In column (5) where
we combine data from all 5 case studies, we find evidence of approximately a 4.1 percentage
point increase in the likelihood of a respondent stating ‘likely’ or ‘very likely’ purchase intent.
In Table 10, we show the robustness of the combined results from column (5) to a similar
sequence of robustness checks to those presented in Table 3. Column (1) shows that our
results are robust to the exclusion of the controls. Column (2) shows our results are robust
to a linear OLS regression for the full intent scale. Column (3) shows our results are robust
to an ordered logit specification for the scale. Column (4) shows the results when we use
Favorable Opinion as the dependent variable. Interestingly, compared to Table 3 the point
estimate for the coefficient of interest is more precisely estimated here, suggesting that oﬄine
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ad bans can affect attitudes towards the product as well as purchase intent. Column (5)
again shows little effect of the oﬄine advertising ban for ad recall. Columns (6)-(8) repeat
the falsification checks presented in Table 8 for the combined data from our four case studies.
In all cases we do not find any significant effect of oﬄine alcohol ad bans on the purchase
intent for categories that are not alcohol.
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5 Awareness
In this section, we explore one potential mechanism for the result that online advertising is
more effective in places where out-of-home advertising is banned. Specifically, we examine
the possibility that media bans reduce the likelihood that consumers will be saturated with
media images and that therefore online advertising will be more effective in these places.
As Ackerberg (2001) points out, the effectiveness of advertising may differ depending on
whether consumers are aware of the products. To understand the role of awareness, we
divided the products advertised in our sample in two ways: based on stated awareness of
people in our sample who had not seen the ads,7 and based on whether the product is a new
product. Table 11 presents the results for the state-level variation in regulation. The effect
is far stronger for new products and for products that had below-average awareness levels.
For products that had above-average awareness levels, we no longer find a significant effect
of ad bans or even for advertising exposure.
Table 12 presents the results for combined data for municipalities where there was a
change in regulation during our data. The results again suggest that the effect of the ad ban
is stronger for low-awareness products. Interestingly, we do not see such a strong effect for
new products or at least the estimates are statistically identical for the effect of the ban. This
may be because these were markets where new products gained high awareness levels swiftly.
As a robustness check we repeated the estimation in table 11 for the placebo categories of
Junk Food, CPG products and other beverages that we observed examined in Table 8 in the
appendix in Table A-3. The results for the key coefficients were either insignificant or of the
wrong sign.
One explanation for these results is that media saturation levels through ‘at home’ media
7As might be expected, mean awareness levels are lower in states with advertising bans. 70 percent
of respondents said they knew about the product in states that had no advertising ban, and 67 percent
of respondents said they knew about the product in states that had bans (The difference is statistically
significant at the p<0.001 level.). We split the sample at average awareness levels for the products.
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Table 11: Awareness affects impact of online advertising in advertising ban states
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Awareness Low Awareness Old Product New Product
Exposed × Ad Ban 0.0194 0.0974∗∗ 0.0476∗ 0.119∗∗
(0.0349) (0.0403) (0.0288) (0.0470)
Exposed 0.0330 0.107∗∗∗ 0.0572∗∗∗ 0.0557∗
(0.0245) (0.0293) (0.0212) (0.0338)
Female -0.0306 0.222∗∗∗ -0.0368 0.267∗∗∗
(0.0340) (0.0256) (0.0254) (0.0277)
Std. Internet Hours 0.0351∗∗ 0.0663∗∗∗ 0.0481∗∗∗ 0.0816∗∗∗
(0.0152) (0.0193) (0.0155) (0.0221)
Std. Income -0.0225∗∗ -0.0167 -0.0201∗ 0.00238
(0.0109) (0.0177) (0.0106) (0.0190)
Std. Age -0.0592∗∗∗ -0.294∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗
(0.0160) (0.0188) (0.0156) (0.0257)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Campaign Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30671 30908 40362 21218
Log-Likelihood -19045.9 -16632.3 -23403.2 -12380.8
Logit estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01.
‘Ad Ban’ is collinear with state fixed effects and omitted.
such as television and radio are already high enough for older, high-awareness products so
that a ban on oﬄine media makes little difference. Online advertising can only overcome
the effects of oﬄine media bans when the media bans have an effect in the first place. This
result is consistent with our main result being driven by diminishing marginal effectiveness
of advertising goodwill because products with high awareness already have steep diminishing
returns to incremental advertising.
6 Implications
This paper uses field experiment data on alcohol advertising to show that online display
advertising has the largest impact in locations with restrictions on out-of-home advertising.
We interpret this to suggest that the online advertising substitutes for the banned oﬄine
ads, thereby reducing the effectiveness of local advertising bans. Many authors have argued
that the internet reduces the effectiveness of local regulations, but outside of tax policy there
has been little systematic empirical examination of this phenomenon. Our results contribute
to this literature, showing how the internet allows firms and consumers to circumvent oﬄine
restrictions. While the alcohol advertising bans may still achieve their intended purpose of
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Table 12: Awareness affects impact of online advertising in locations with changes in adver-
tising bans
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Awareness Low Awareness Old Product New Product
Purchase Intent
Exposed X Ad Ban X Affected Group 0.284 1.123∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗ 0.542
(0.339) (0.338) (0.269) (0.391)
Exposed X Ad Ban -0.102 -0.499∗∗ -0.246 -0.483∗∗
(0.178) (0.220) (0.164) (0.241)
Exposed X Affected Group -0.130 -0.713∗∗∗ -0.340 -0.418
(0.281) (0.260) (0.224) (0.380)
Exposed × Ad Ban -0.197 -0.188 -0.135 -0.235
(0.161) (0.181) (0.128) (0.269)
Exposed 0.0873 0.449∗∗∗ 0.159 0.449∗∗
(0.159) (0.174) (0.135) (0.208)
Ad Ban -0.0707 0.381∗∗ -0.0392 0.562∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.169) (0.119) (0.184)
Ad Ban X Affected Group 0.0405 -0.617∗∗ -0.113 -0.426
(0.347) (0.295) (0.227) (0.317)
Campaign Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3649 4155 5486 2371
Log-Likelihood -2170.7 -2289.9 -3117.9 -1376.6
Logit estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the survey level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01.
reducing the exposure of school children to oﬄine alcohol ads, our results suggest these bans
will be relatively ineffective for regular internet users.
Our results also have important implications for managers trying to evaluate the merits
of combining online and oﬄine campaigns. They can be viewed as an unusual natural exper-
iment which allows empirical analysis to tease apart the relationship between the presence
of oﬄine advertising and the effectiveness of online advertising. Usually such analysis is
problematic because the launch of both types of campaigns is contemporaneous, making it
hard to tease apart the separate effects of either or how they interact. As discussed by Silk
et al. (2001), it has been suggested that online advertising could potentially complement
and enhance the effectiveness of oﬄine campaigns. However, our results suggest that instead
oﬄine and online advertising appear to be substitutes. Though the majority of our results
focus on the effect of outdoors advertising on banner advertising, the fact that our findings
appear to extend to both TV and print media in select markets suggests this result is likely
robust across media types.
There are of course limitations to our study that suggest potential avenues for future
research. First, we rely on stated expressions of purchase intent and not actual purchase
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data. While these measures allow us to determine that online advertising is more effective
in places with out-of-home advertising bans, the use of these measures means that we are
unable to define the precise impact of the internet on increasing alcohol sales in places with
bans relative to places without. Second, our study focuses on alcohol advertising bans, and
it is possible that bans on different products may have different effects. Third, our results
are specific to the study of state-specific bans on oﬄine media in the United States. We do
not study attempts by national governments or international regulatory bodies to enforce
bans on advertising on the internet. It is therefore not clear the extent to which our results
apply more broadly to national bans on all alcohol advertising, such as the ban imposed in
Sweden, or how our results would apply to laws such as the EU ‘Tobacco Advertising Ban’
that attempt to restrict internet advertising directly.
A puzzle that we leave for future research is why what appears to be out-of-equilibrium
behavior persists. If internet advertising has greater returns in states with ad bans, it is
an open question whether alcohol advertising campaign managers are aware of this and, if
they are aware, why they do not act upon it by attempting to advertise on geographically
targeted websites. One potential explanation is that because alcohol advertising is monitored
and tracked by interest groups and governments, alcohol advertising firms have not wanted
to court censure by appearing to use the internet to circumvent local jurisdictions. It would
be interesting to explore whether this is in fact the case.
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Appendix
A Further Robustness Checks
Column (1) of Table A-1 presents results of a linear probability model. The results are very similar
to the logit specification presented in Table 3. This provides more evidence that, despite the
concerns expressed by Ai and Norton (2003) about the interpretation of interaction coefficients in
non-linear models, our results remain robust.
We then check that our results are robust to dropping states where the laws apply predominantly
to dry counties. Because the decision to live in a dry county is endogenous, and related to attitudes
to the consumption of alcohol, we also reran our regressions excluding these dry counties. Column
(2) of Table A-1 presents the results, which are similar to before.
In our main specifications, we include laws that ban all billboards, not just alcohol advertising.
This is the case for Vermont, Maine, Hawaii and Alaska. We show that our results are robust to
excluding these states (Column (3) of Table A-1). Their exclusion does not appear to affect our
results.
There is also the potential concern that wine may have a slightly different target market from
liquor and beer. Column (4) of Table A-1 shows that our results are robust to the exclusion of
wine.
Column (5) of Table A-1 shows the robustness of our results to the exclusion of people who saw
the ads multiple times either because they refreshed the webpage or because they returned to the
webpage later after navigating away from it within the site. If anything, our results are stronger
(though slightly less precise) when we exclude these multiply treated individuals. This suggests
that out-of-home ad bans have the largest impact on the effectiveness of ads that are only seen
once, rather than multiple times. In other words, they make the ‘first impression’ from an online
ad more effective.
Table A-2 shows that are main results are similar to Tables 8 and 11 when we use purchase
intent scale as our dependent measure in a linear regression.
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Table A-1: Robustness Checks
Linear Probability Dry State Excluding No Billboard Excluding Wine Exposed Once
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Purchase Intent Purchase Intent Purchase Intent Purchase Intent Purchase Intent
Exposed × Ad Ban 0.0127∗∗ 0.0605∗∗ 0.0674∗∗ 0.0641∗∗ 0.0608∗
(0.00539) (0.0267) (0.0272) (0.0283) (0.0336)
Exposed 0.0139∗∗∗ 0.0706∗∗∗ 0.0678∗∗∗ 0.0674∗∗∗ 0.0445∗
(0.00319) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0169) (0.0238)
Female 0.0180∗∗∗ 0.0868∗∗∗ 0.0926∗∗∗ 0.0908∗∗∗ 0.0677∗∗∗
(0.00366) (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0190) (0.0205)
Std. Internet Hours 0.00955∗∗∗ 0.0479∗∗∗ 0.0468∗∗∗ 0.0479∗∗∗ 0.0497∗∗∗
(0.00251) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0128) (0.0127)
Std. Income -0.00409∗∗ -0.0184∗ -0.0195∗ -0.0195∗ -0.0203∗
(0.00197) (0.00968) (0.00998) (0.0107) (0.0108)
Std. Age -0.0323∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗
(0.00278) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0163) (0.0141)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Campaign Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 61580 60526 60672 58981 47026
Log-Likelihood -37648.5 -35316.7 -35435.0 -34475.3 -27084.4
R-Squared 0.0461
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01.
‘Ad Ban’ is collinear with state fixed effects and omitted.
As a robustness check we repeated the estimation in Table 11 for the placebo categories of Junk
Food, CPG products and other beverages that we observed examined in Table 8 in Table A-3. The
results for the key coefficients were either insignificant or of the wrong sign.
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B Sources of Laws
Table B-1: Sources of State and Municipal Laws
Alabama Section 28-3-16 - Advertising of alcoholic beverages. (Acts 1936-37, Ex. Sess., No. 66, p. 40;
Code 1940, T. 29, 12; Acts 1978, No. 434, p. 442.)
Alaska Sec 19.25.075 - Blanket Ban on billboards on highways
California California Business and Professions Code Sections 25612.5(c)(7), 25617
Baltimore Enacted 1994, Upheld by Fourth Circuit US Court of Appeals Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc.
v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, No. 94-2141, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir 1995)
Hawaii 264-72 Control of outdoor advertising (Blanket ban on billboards on highways)
Idaho 23-607 23-607. ADVERTISING.
Kansas Signs, advertising and other promotional activities Background. K.S.A. 41-714 was amended by the
Legislature in 2005 to remove all of the statutory restrictions on advertising and other promotional
activities. Instead, the Legislature delegated to the Secretary of Revenue the power to regulate
liquor advertising and other promotion activities by administrative regulation. [Subsection (b) of
K.S.A. 41-714]
Kentucky 244.540
History: Recodified 1942 Ky. Acts ch. 208, sec. 1, effective October 1, 1942, from Ky. Stat. sec.
2554b-208
Maine Title 23 Chapter 15: Protection of Highways Subchapter 1: Signs and Markets Article 1 23 S1153
(Blanket ban on billboards on highways)
Missisippi Section 67-1-85. Regulation of advertising and display of alcoholic beverages.
Sources: Codes, 1942, Section 10265-33; Laws, 1966, ch. 540, Section 33; Laws, 1968, ch. 592,
Section 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 350, Section 1; Laws, 1982, ch. 419; Laws, 1986, ch. 450, Section
1; Laws, 1988, ch. 562, Section 2; Laws, 1990, ch. 569, Section 5, eff from and after passage
(approved April 9, 1990)., Also: ‘Chapter 02 Advertising 100 No person, firm or corporation shall
originate advertisements in dry counties of this State, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. 67-1-1,
67-1-13, 67-1-15 and 67-5-5.
New Hampshire Source. 1990, 255:1. 1991, 355:59. 1992, 195:2. 1996, 275:27, eff. June 10, 1996. 2003, 231:27, 28,
eff. July 1, 2003.
Ohio 4301:1-1-44 Advertising.
History: Eff. 7-5-50; 9-20-84; 4-16-88; 1-10-99; 7-1-01; Rescinded and reenacted eff. 6-4-04
Rule promulgated under: RC Chapter 119.
Rule authorized by: RC 4301.03(B), 4301.03(E)
Rule amplifies: RC 4301.03(B), 4301.03(E), 4301.22, 4301.24
R.C. 119.032 review dates: 04/01/2009
Oklahoma Okla. Const. Article XXVIII , Section 5 or 37 O.S. 516 (1981)
City Of Philadelphia 17-110. Passed by the City Council on December 4, 2003. The Bill was Signed by the Mayor on
December 18, 2003.
Texas Section 108.52. Acts 1977, 65th Leg., p. 521, ch. 194, Section 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1977. Amended by
Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 501, ch. 231, Section 2, eff. Aug. 27, 1979; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 62,
Section 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1997
Utah 32A-12-401.Amended by Chapter 314, 2003 General Session
Vermont Sec. 4. 7 V.S.A. Section 666:
Approved: June 3, 1994
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